Page:CAB Accident Report, Pan American World Airways Flight 212.pdf/6

- 6 - equipment and the ILS serving runway 4R at JFK Airport. The equipment was found to be functioning normally. A flight check of the ILS was made by the FAA on April 8, 1964, and 1t too was found to be operating normally.

A weather observation taken by the U. S. Weather Bureau at 2254 (9 minutes prior to the accident) 1n part contained the following. 300 feet thin broken, measured 1,400 feet overcast, visibility 1-1/2 miles, fog, temperature 47°F, dewpoint 47°F, wind 210°, 4 knots, altimeter setting 29.72 inches, runway 31L RVR 2,000, runway 4R RVR 6,000+ The next observation taken at 2314 (11 minutes after the accident) in part contained the following 100 feet thin broken, measured 1,400 feet overcast, visibility 1—1/2 miles, fog, temperature 47°F, dew point 47°F, wind 230°, 6 knots, altimeter setting 29.73 inches, runway 4R RVR 2,600 The 2300 upper wind observation at JFK Airport showed the wind at the 1,000-foot altitude to be from 280° true at a velocity of 26 knots.

Runway $R at JFK Airport is 8,400 feet long and 150 feet wide. The runway sur- face is paved concrete with a 120-foot asphalt overrun extending beyond the far end of the runway. The lighting system 1ncludes approach lights with sequence flashers, high intensity runway lights, and touchdown zone lights. The touchdown zone lights extend along the first 3,000 feet of the runway with runway centerline lights start mg at the 3,000-foot mark and continuing to the far end of the runway. The high intensity lights extend along the entire length of the runway on both sides. All lights were on and operating normally at the time of the flight's approach and landing.

No ground witnesses could be located who had observed the approach and landing of PAA 212.

The initial touchdown of the aircraft could not be determined by usual examin- ation of the runway surface. The first discernible marks that could be associated with PAA 212 were identified as those made by the left main landing gear (MLG) tire. These were whitish scrub marks and began at a point 7,600 feet from the approach end of runway 4R and continued to a point on the asphalt overrun 14 feet beyond the end of the runway. Whitish scrub marks identified with the right MLG could be distinguished as commencing 8,300 feet from the approach end of runway 4R and also con tinuing 14 feet beyond the end of the runway. These marks showed that the aircraft veered slightly to the left of the runway centerline shortly before passing over the macadam plast pad at the end of the runway. No nose gear tire marks could be detected on the runway.

Examination of the aircraft revealed that the forward section of the fuselage as practically severed from the remainder of the aircraft around the entire circumference at approximately fuselage station 600. General distribution and orientation of shear wrinkles in the skin forward of the fracture and structural components at the fracture indicate a compressive load was exerted on the forward fuselage section at the time of impact with the water. Other parts of the aircraft received varying degrees of damage from major to none. All spoilers remained intact with the exception of the inboard ends of the inboard spoilers which were damaged by the adjacent traling edge structure when the trailing edge structure was pushed upward by the inboard flap carriages and tracks causing the inboard foreflaps to contact the  spoilers. Matching interference marks corresponded to the spoilers being in the retracted position at the time of occurrence.