Page:CAB Accident Report, Mid-Air Collision on 7 November 1959.pdf/5

 The Board also concludes that the pilot of the PA-22 should have informed the tower controller when he penetrated the control zone and operated in the vicinity of an airport where a concentration of traffic should be expected.

Finally, the Board concludes that the tower controllers did not conduct a thorough or effective scan of the area for conflicting traffic before they issued a clearance to the formation flight. The Board believes that had they done so they could have seen the PA-22 and been able to inform either it, or the formation, or both, of the presence of traffic.

As a result of this accident the Board recommended to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency that all formation flights, except those involving simulated instrument low approaches and using an observer aircraft, be prohibited in control zones and/or in the vicinity of joint-use airports. In addition, it has been recommended that all aircraft equipped with two-way radio be required to contact the control tower or other communications facility when entering a control zone.

The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the jet formation flight leader and the pilots of the PA-22 to see and avoid one another.

A contributing factor was the failure of the tower personnel to see the PA-22 and take appropriate action.

BY THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD: