Page:CAB Accident Report, Mid-Air Collision on 7 November 1959.pdf/4

- 4 - from either aircraft would be constant up to approximately five seconds before impact.

The Board recognizes that each wingman in a formation flight must direct his attention to the flight leader and cannot, therefore, maintain a lookout for other traffic. Because of this, it is the responsibility of the flight leader to see and avoid other aircraft and effect proper separation for his entire flight.

The Board cannot accept the reasons given for the low pass by the F-84F formation. First, the Board does not believe that practice in slow flight in close formation can be given at speeds of 300 knots.

Second, the low pass described by the pilots of the flight could not in any way be considered simulated instrument approach training.

Third, the Board believes that the flight descended to the usual altitude at which a simulated instrument approach is discontinued, i.e., 1,900 feet, and not the 2,600 feet alleged by the F-84F pilots.

Another factor considered in this accident was the responsibility of the control tower operators. The controllers testified that before the formation flight was cleared for a low approach the entire area was scanned for unreported aircraft. They said this was required to prevent conflict with other aircraft which might be in the vicinity of the airport. No traffic was noted during this visual search and the flight was cleared.

Comparison of the relative speeds of the F-84F's and the Piper indicates that approximately one minute prior to the collision the Piper was approximately three miles from the tower in a southwesterly direction. At that time the formation flight was about 3-1/2 miles north of the tower.

The Board concludes that the weather conditions were not a factor in this accident. Visibility was very good and the line of sight from each aircraft to the other was forward in the directions of flight. The F-84F flight leader and both pilots of the Piper had a responsibility to maintain a strict lookout for other aircraft. Although closure speed was high, adequate opportunity existed to see and avoid one another.

For these reasons the Board concludes that neither pilot was exercising the proper degree of care expected for collision avoidance.

The Board also concludes that the F-84F low pass was a close show formation demonstration at excessive speed and was not an essential part of the mission being performed and, in fact, served no useful purpose in the training curriculum.

Further, it is concluded that National Guard supervisory personnel at least tacitly were aware of and condoned the practice of the low pass. This is evident in that corrective action initiated after this accident does not prohibit the maneuver. In fact, part of the corrective action is to require that all low passes across the field be made in the landing direction over the active runway.