Page:CAB Accident Report, Mid-Air Collision on 30 September 1959.pdf/7

Rh Part 26 of the Civil Air Regulations prescribed certain procedures and practices which certificated air traffic control tower operators should follow. Part 617.21 of the Administrator's Air Navigation Regulations (14 CFR 617) provided that "an airport traffic control tower is responsible for the issuance of clearances and information to pilots of aircraft for the purpose of protecting air traffic by aiding pilots in the prevention of collision between aircraft in the traffic pattern." Section 60.60 of the Civil Air Regulations defines air traffic control as "a service operated by appropriate authority to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic." The duties of the airport traffic controller, therefore, include assisting the person in command of an aircraft by providing such advice and information as may be useful for the safe and efficient conduct of the flight. The failure of the tower controllers to observe the Aeronca L-16 accomplishing touch-and-go landing on runway 15 indicates a neglect of these responsibilities and duties.

The Board believes that the air traffic controllers should have used every means at their disposal, including radio communication, to warn the radio-equipped aircraft of any dangerous situation which might cause a collision. Failure to advise the Cessna 140 pilot by radio while on the downwind and base leg after it appeared that the Aeronca L-16 was not altering course was one of the causal factors in this accident.

Conclusions

The Board conludesconcludes [sic] that the Cessna 140 pilot, after being cleared by radio, entered the traffic pattern outside of, below, and slightly behind the Aeronca L-16 which was already in the traffic pattern accomplishing touch-and-go landings. The Aeronca L-16 was hidden from the view of the Cessna 140 pilot by the left wing of the Cessna, the Cessna being below and to the right rear of the Aeronca. Each pilot continued his landing approach unaware of the presence of the other and without accurate visual or timely verbal warning from the tower until too late to avoid a collision. Visual light indications that were given were mistakenly directed to the Cessna 140 which the tower controller believed was the Aeronca L-16. The Cessna 140 pilot had the best opportunity to observe the Aeronca L-16 as he traversed his 45—degree entry to the downwind leg. He remained behind, slightly below, and to the right of the Aeronca L-16 throughout the remainder of the traffic pattern. The Cessna pilot's failure to observe the Aeronca L-16 was due to either a blind spot caused by a portion of the Cessna blocking out his view of the Aeronca, or his failure to adequately clear himself as he entered the downwind leg, and as he made his left turns to the base leg and final approach.