Page:CAB Accident Report, General Airways DC-3 crash on 1 February 1959.pdf/8

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"At this time the Captain knew that the fuel supply was getting

to be critical in getting in to San Antonio. The ice and extra drag had used more fuel; he called for weather reports from several of the airports closest to us and, while I was only hearing snatches of the conversation, I gathered more of the area was reporting freezing rain and-low visibility; San Antonio was the first station that had an on course that was reporting above freezing temperatures; so, he decided to continue on to San Antonio and look for emer— gency airports on the route. The only emergency airport available seemed to be Kerrville which was some 50 miles short of our destination. By the time we were a few minutes short of Kerrville airport the pilot had tuned in the homer at Kerrville and found we were receiving it properdy and at this point made the decision to attempt to land at Kerrville rather than continue on to San Antonio since the fuel supply'was getting real critical by this‘time. ﬁt this point we were flying at h,000 feet presumably to have been cleared to that altitude; we were allowed some few feet less than A,OOO feet in that sec— tion which would put us approximately 2,000 feet above the terrain. we went to the homer at that altitude and then took an outbound heading for a normal descent and approach; completed the procedure turn, returned to the homer and from there to the airport descending continuously. I don't believe anyone in the cockpit saw the airport though we must have been close. Ice was covering the front windshield entirely and the only visibility was from.the side window which the pilot was able to‘Open and could look out from; although unable to see the airport, we had at this time contact conditions and could see the ground.) I remember passing over a highway and car lights being visible below. _Fuel supply by this time was so low that the gauges could hardly be regarded as reliable.

"The pilot decided to make a second attempt at an approach but rather than follow recommended approach altitude maintained his contact with the ground rather than climb back into the overcast. Somewhere during the second approach attempt the pilot made his decision to bring the plane in for a wheels up belly landing rather than risk the possibility of the fuel running out during blind conditions in the overcast, the re—entry of which would be necessary if we were to go through a normal approach procedure.- When he had made that decision, I went to the rear to warn the passengers to keep their seat belts tightly fastened and at the first sign of any emergency to put their heads in their laps. I returned forward and the pilot was still search— ing for a spot to set down. About this point one of the engines sputtered and was out of fuel. A few seconds later we were making our forced landing. I had taken a seat on theufloor facing the rear just behind the bulkhead at the rear of the pilot.

"When the plane finally stopped sliding I was on my back and pinned under an assortment of debris."

Passengers confirm ice accretion on wing surfaces and cabin Mihdows but were generally unaware of operational matters. The commander of the military aircraft which served as a relay station,stated:

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"After contact was established with the distressed aircraft he reportcf that he had 'six feet of ice on the aircraft and was stalling out every two min-

utes.’ Kerrville to the distressed aircraft. the distressed aircraft that he would try again. said he had been seen from the ground at Kerrville directly over the airport.

we relayed the Beacon frequency and the description of the let down at

After making an approach we were told by San Antonio Center called and