Page:CAB Accident Report, Flying Tiger Line Flight 282.pdf/5

 Flight Engineer Paul M. Entz, age 37, was employed by The Flying Tiger Line on November 5, 1956. He held airframe and powerplant certificate No. 1283680, and flight engineer certificate No. 1360058. He had a total of 4,113 flying hours of which 3,811 hours were in L-1049H aircraft. He held a current first-class medical certificate with no limitations. Flight Engineer Entz had 17 hours of rest during the previous 24-hour period. He had been on duty for 7 hours but had not flown except for the deadhead flight from Los Angeles.

Blood specimens from each crewmember were subjected to toxicological examination. Results were negative for the first officer and engineer and only a small amount of blood ethanol was indicated in the captain's specimen. Since alcohol production may be associated with post-mortem changes, the concentration did not of itself constitute evidence of alcohol ingestion. There was no evidence to indicate the possible consumption of alcohol by the captain prior to the flight.

Examination of the captain's heart indicated extensive arteriosclerosis of the coronary arteries with considerable narrowing of the lumina of the vessels. However, there was no thrombus or plague hemorrhage found that would have acutely compromised the circulation within the arteries. There was also no anatomic evidence that the captain had experienced an episode of anginal pain in the few seconds preceding the crash.

Review of the medical records of all the crewmembers failed to disclose any indications of significant pre-existing disease.

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There was no evidence of failure of the powerplants, systems, or structural components of the aircraft prior to initial impact.

When the aircraft taxied from the ramp, it weighed 142,073 pounds, within 27 pounds of the allowable takeoff gross weight. The c.g. limits for maximum gross Weight of this aircraft are 23 to 32 percent of MAC. Flight 282 had a c.g. of 29.3 percent. The station agent certified on the flight clearance that the aircraft was loaded within limits.

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Surface weather charts for the evening of December 23 and the early morning hours of December 24 indicate that San Francisco was under the influence of a cold frontal system moving onshore. At the time of the accident rain, low cloudiness, and considerable fog were shown along virtually the entire Pacific Coast. The San Francisco terminal forecast issued at 2045 (Dec. 23) valid for a 12-hour period beginning at 2100 was in part as follows:

2100–0400 — 700 feet scattered clouds, ceiling 1,800 feet overcast, visibility 6 miles in light rain, occasionally ceiling 600 feet broken clouds, 1,800 feet overcast, visibility 6 miles in light rain.