Page:CAB Accident Report, Eastern Air Lines Flight 45 - Revised.pdf/5

 Testimony of Captain Davis further indicated that he had experience with military pilots which indicated that particular care was necessary in the vicinity of army installations. His apprehensions in this respect demanded that the portion of his flight near Florence Army Air Field should have been conducted with more than ordinary vigilance. Regulations prescribing "right-of-way" do not relieve a pilot of the responsibility of exercising sufficient caution to guarantee the safe conduct of the flight as far as is reasonably possible.

One minute before the collision occurred, the A-26 was less than six miles from the DC-3 and at a relative bearing of approximately 25 degrees left of the longitudinal axis of the latter aircraft. A half minute prior to the collision the two aircraft were approximately two and three-quarters miles apart with the A-26 at a relative bearing of less than 40 degrees from the DC-3. The A-26, therefore remained until the time of the accident within the forward 180 degrees of the DC-3 and at no time was in such a location with respect to the airline pilots as would have required the exercise of undue caution beyond the azimuth of reference normally scanned in searching for possibly hazardous air traffic.

Inasmuch as contact conditions prevailed, both pilots should have been aware that traffic could reasonably be expected at any altitude at any time during the course of the flight. Both pilots were operating under contact clearances and understood that the only traffic separation possible was provided by their own vigilance and proper flying technique.

Although in a prolonged turn, the A-26 for at least one minute prior to the collision remained in such an attitude and direction of flight as would have made the DC-3 clearly visible to him had he been attentive to other traffic. For the last thirty seconds of the A-26's turn, the DC-3 was almost directly ahead of the Army pilot and the only possible reason for