Page:CAB Accident Report, Delta Air Lines Flight 8715.pdf/3

- 3 - All engines were started and the first officer stated that the hydraulic pressure was normal, 3000 p.s.i. The wing flaps were lowered to 30° prior to taxi.

At approximately 0229, Delta 8715 called Memphis Ground Control and advised that they were proceeding in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) to Jackson, Mississippi. Memphis Ground Control responded with the following taxi clearance: "Delta eighty-seven fifteen Memphis ground, cleared to runway two seven, wind three zero zero degrees variable to three zero degrees at one five, altimeter three zero two nine, time zero eight two nine and three quarters (Greenwich Mean Time). Taxi to your right out the center taxiway and east on the east-west runway." (See Attachment #1). As the aircraft taxied out, the flight engineer raised the flaps from 30 to 20 degrees, the takeoff setting. Neither the flight engineer nor the first officer monitored the system hydraulic pressure at any time during the taxiing.

Shortly thereafter Delta 8715 transmitted the following message to Memphis Ground Control: "Memphis ground eighty-seven fifteen you want us to go all the way down the east-west or cross over the west?" Memphis Ground Control responded: "Turn right ahead taxi east past the north-south and after you pass the north-south runway turn left the second taxiway and taxi parallel to the east-west and hold short of two seven at the end." Delta 8715 acknowledged.

At approximately 0230 Memphis Ground Control issued an IFR clearance which was read back correctly by Delta 8715.

The aircraft proceeded east on Runway 9 to Taxiway "D" where it made a left turn to the north. When the position of the aircraft on taxiway "D" was detected by the ground controller he initiated the following transmission: "Eighty-seven fifteen, turn right on the ramp ahead and taxi east and hold short of two seven at the end." The flight did not acknowledge this message. Shortly thereafter the ground controller transmitted this message: "Eighty-seven fifteen...use caution in taxiing on the military ramp." This transmission was not acknowledged by the flight. The ground controller stated that he transmitted the caution message because he could see the C-123B in the landing light beam of Delta 8715.

The flight engineer said that as the aircraft proceeded north on Taxiway "D" the first indication of difficulty was the captain's exclamation which he understood to mean that he had lost power. The flight engineer interpreted this first to mean engine power; however, finding the engines to be operating normally he then, as he said, realized the captain "couldn't steer the airplane".

As testified by the flight engineer and corroborated by the first officer, the captain then put the sequence bar down and pulled the throttles into the reverse range. After a few seconds, when the props were slow going into reverse, he moved them out of reverse range into normal idle range. In point of time this was just a few seconds before the collision.