Page:CAB Accident Report, Continental Can Company plane crash.pdf/5

 1 - VHF Receiver, Aircraft Radio Corp, Type 15D with manual instrumentation 1 - UEF Glideslope Receiver, 10 channel, Collins 51V1

1- Marker Beacon Receiver, Bendix MN-53, with single three-light presentation

PANEL INSTRUMENTS (Associated with radio, not a complete list)

2 - Gyro Horizons, electrically operated, Sperry 11-5 with quick erectors

1 - Sperry C-2 Directional Gyro, with magnetic slaving

1 - Radio Magnetic Indicator, Bendix 36105, with switch for Omni or Red ADF

1 - Course Selector for Collins Omni

1 - Course Selector for ARC Omni

2 - ID48 Course Deviation Indicator with switching for either set to either indicator

1 - Set Instruments for Zero Reader

1 - Dual ADF Indicator

STEERING COMPUTOR

1 - Sperry Zero Reader, 2-2

INVERTORS

2 - Leland SE5-2, 1500 VA

WEATHER RADAR

1 - Bendix C Band, RDR-1C

Captain John R Dunham, age 41, had a total flying time of 10,577 hours, of which 805 hours had been in B-26's He had flown 51 hours during the 30 days preceding the accident and had had a rest period of 19 hours and 45 minutes before the final takeoff. Mr. Dunham had been employed by Continental Can Company since January 1952 and held all FAA certification appropriate for the flight.

Copilot Donald Martin, age 40, had a total flying time of 3,766 hours, of which 1,726 hours had been in B-26's. He had flown 55 hours during the 30 days preceding the accident and his rest period before the final flight was 19 hours and 45 minutes. Mr Martan had been employed by Continental Can since July 1950, and held all FAA certification for the flight

Analysis and Conclusions

It is apparent that there must have been control difficulty of an undetermined nature This may have been the breakage of a structural member or possibly a deformation or bending of a part, precipitating the dive it also seems logical that this had its inception while the fight was in severe turbulence only a few minutes earlier. It is not possible to do more than sumuse as to the genesis of the trouble. because a considerable number of initial malfunctioning could have resulted in the aircraft's turn and final plunge. The physical evidence recorded did not reveal the nature of the trouble. The nature of the aircraft's maneuvers prior to the final dive, and their proximity to the Marion Airport, may suggest an intent to land there; there is no tangible evidence of this