Page:CAB Accident Report, Continental Airlines Flight 12.pdf/10

- 10 - passengers from the aft section of the aircraft as well as three from the lounge, forward of the wing, used the overwing exits to escape.

The remainder of the passengers and cabin attendants left the aircraft through the aft passenger entrance door. The aft galley door was operable but the hostess decided to open the aft passenger door. A passenger had to assist in opening the door because it was on the high side of the fuselage and had to be pushed up as well as out, and the hostess was not strong enough to do it by herself. The floor level was 5 feet above the ground so the hostess extended the inflatable slide. More than 31 people left the aircraft through this door. (See Attachment No. III.)

A number of persons went back into the cabin at different times to verify that no one had remained inside the aircraft, and assist in the removal of a passenger trapped in his seat. This passenger, sitting in the window seat near FS 1040, was pinned to his seat by the seat row ahead of him. The Director of Personnel Services finally released him by tearing seat backs from the seats of the row ahead after several passengers had failed in attempts to free him.

The consensus of passengers was that there were no lights on in the cabin; however, the first officer went to the cabin as soon as he left the cockpit and reported the lights were on.

During the investigation an examination of the 11 battery powered lights used to mark aircraft exits, when aircraft power is not available, revealed that one light was switched off and the others were "on." All the batteries were checked and found to be completely discharged.

One passenger reported that either his seat belt or its attachment failed, and there were seats reported to have come "partially loose." One passenger required assistance from other passengers to unfasten his seat belt.

1.15 Tests and Research

At the request of the Board, the aircraft manufacturer calculated the stopping distance required, from touchdown, for a B-707 under the conditions that existed at Kansas City during the landing of Flight 12. Considering a braking coefficient of "O", touchdown airspeed 135 knots, maximum braking, spoilers, and reverse thrust, the landing rollout would have been 7,100 feet. At 160 knots it would have been 8,800 feet. By increasing the braking coefficient to .15 the rollout distance would have been 3,800 feet at 135 knots and 4,500 feet at 160 knots. On a dry runway with a braking coefficient of .35 these distances are further reduced to 2,300 feet and 3,000 feet respectively. An additional calculation was made for a braking coefficient of .05 which indicated that the rollout distance would be 6,600 feet with a l35-knot touchdown airspeed.

A national Aeronautics and Space Agency aerospace technologist participated in the investigation and testified in the deposition proceedings. He testified that there are three known types of hydroplaning. Dynamic hydroplaning which