Page:CAB Accident Report, American Airlines Flight 9 (1945).pdf/3

 All of these facts taken together would seem to indicate a general laxity in dispatching and flight supervision and a need for continued training and checking of pilots in proper flight planning.

In this particular accident the evidence indicated that the company's dispatcher at New York had approved the Captain's plan to fly the route from Washington to Tri-City according to contact flight rules at 4000 feet and prior to the departure of the trip from New York. While on the ground at Washington the Captain had discussed the weather ahead with a company dispatcher and had been informed that other pilots had been planning instrument flights because of existing and forecast weather and the fact that the flight was being conducted at night. Evidence was offered that the Captain decided that he could fly contact as he expected an improvement in the weather, and chose an altitude of 4000 feet ostensibly to avoid headwinds and possible icing conditions at higher altitudes. This plan was approved although weather indications showed the ceilings en route and forecast to be below contact flight minimum with a trend toward less favorable weather. Also, as has been previously stated, contact flight clearance at 4000 feet over this terrain was in violation of the Civil Air Regulations.

The company dispatcher approved the Captain's flight plan but issued an instrument clearance covering an alternate plan, with the understanding that the Captain would request assignment of an instrument altitude from Airway Traffic Control if he found it necessary to go on instruments. It would seem that this had been the general company practice when weather conditions were marginal or doubtful.

While flight clearance are the joint responsibility of Captain and dispatcher, there can be no doubt that once a flight has taken off the Captain is responsible for its safe conduct. The Captain is authorized in the event of an emergency to deviate at his own discretion from his previously approved flight plan. Unless in an extreme emergency, he is required to notify Airway Traffic Control of any action he may take. Despite the primary responsibility of the Captain, it is the company dispatcher's responsibility to maintain a close check on flight conditions and keep the Captain advised as to expected weather changes. In the instant case it would appear that although the Captain received an amended flight plan near Pulaski he did not promptly go to a safe altitude nor did the company dispatcher advise the Captain further concerning amendment to his flight plan. As no evidence could be found that mechanical or operational difficulties were encountered by this flight, it can only be assumed that flight planning errors predominated although in justice to the pilots it should be pointed out that there could