Page:CAB Accident Report, American Airlines Flight 9.pdf/24

 thus still further reducing the visibility from the cockpit and making the airport surfaces slippery. He could have anticipated that his brakes would for this reason be ineffective on the turf and that he would not have positive control of the airplane after he had actually landed. Furthermore, such wind as had been reported was somewhat unfavorable for a landing on No. 1 runway and even more unfavorable for the direction in which the final landing actually was made. In view of these factors we consider that Captain Susott did not exercise sound judgment in continuing to a landing after finding it necessary to change his flight path to avoid the poles. Captain Susott should have applied power, pulled up and proceeded to his alternate, abandoning all attempts to land at St. Louis. Ceiling and visibility minimums have been established in order that all concerned may have available reasonable standards below, which no operations are permitted. When weather conditions reach the minimum standards permitting operations, that in itself should be no indication to pilots or other operating personnel that landings should be made. On the contrary, when weather conditions have reached the minimums, there is a corresponding increase in responsibility upon a pilot to make sure that all other conditions are favorable for continued operations or a landing, and pilot technique, knowledge, and judgment then are thrown into bold relief as being of primary importance.