Page:CAB Accident Report, American Airlines Flight 383.pdf/14

– 13 – two control heads showed frequencies of 118.30 mcs. (Cincinnati Tower frequency) and 110.95 mcs. (ILS frequency for runway 18 is 110.90 mcs.).

The copilot's course deviation indicator (CDI) was found with a course setting of 18 – (the third character was unreadable) and a compass card reading of 240 degrees. No reliable readings could be obtained from the copilot's remote magnetic directional indicator (RMDI) because of damage to the instrument.

The RMDI and the CDI located on the captain's panel were not completely recovered and no information was obtained from these instruments. Examination of the No. 1 vertical gyro and both directional gyros revealed evidence of rotation at impact. No information could be obtained from either of the two remaining vertical gyros installed in the aircraft.

The three Kollsman altimeters installed in the aircraft were recovered from the wreckage and were examined at the manufacturer's facility. The captain's (No. 1) altimeter was found at a barometric setting of 29.06 inches with the index marker set on 800 feet. A valid drum position could not be obtained because of internal mechanism disruption. The copilot's (No. 2) altimeter was found at a barometric scale setting of 29.03 inches with the index marker positioned at 815 feet. Only portions of the center instrument panel (No. 3) altimeter were recovered and no barometric, index marker, or drum position information could be obtained. A discussion of the American Airlines procedures for altimeter utilization and related procedures will be found in section 1.15 under the heading of AA altimeter procedures.

1.13 Fire

Following impact an intense ground fire erupted which completely destroyed the aircraft cabin forward of the tail section. Firefighting personnel and equipment arrived in the vicinity approximately 15 minutes after the accident occurred but the inaccessibility of the accident site precluded utilization of this equipment.

1.14 Survival Aspects

There were 58 persons fatally injured in the accident. These fatalities were attributable to severe trauma, fire, or both. Three of the four survivors were thrown clear of the aircraft during the deceleration and breakup. The fourth survivor managed to crawl out of the wreckage through a hole in the front end of the fuselage.

1.15 Tests and Research

Examination of the AA 727 flight training curriculum disclosed that the normal VFR (training) pattern for Boeing 727 type aircraft (see Attachment #3) calls for the downwind leg to be flown at a distance of 1-1/2 miles out from the runway. Since the flight recorder, ATC observations, and witness observed flightpaths all indicate that the downwind leg on this flight was flown at a distance of 4-1/2 miles from runway 18, this aspect of the approach was explored in detail. Testimony from AA training and operations representatives at the public hearing indicated that although the VFR training pattern taught to pilots in the training syllabus serves as the standard or desired VFR approach, many variances of this pattern can be, and are, utilized in actual line operations. It was stated that the variables in the VFR