Page:CAB Accident Report, American Airlines Flight 1.pdf/17

 Captain Cooper, having received the flight superintendent's authorization to continue the flight, obtained his clearance from the company operations agent with the pertinent weather reports attached and took off at 9:07 p.m. Immediately following the take-off Flight 1 called the Buffalo radio station to see that its transmitter and receiver were functioning properly. As previously stated, the transmitter and receiver had been changed to the company's night frequency at Buffalo. This contact was normal and Flight 1 proceeded on its course. In accordance with the dispatching procedure, all radio contacts after leaving Buffalo, with the exception of the radio check, were to be made with American's Detroit station, however, this procedure did not prevent the captain from contacting any of American's stations on the route if it became necessary. At 9:18 p.m. the Detroit station transmitted to Flight 1 the Airway Traffic Control clearance which authorized Captain Cooper to cruise at 4000 feet until the flight reached the vicinity of Florence, Ontario, at which time he would start to descend for Detroit.

Since we have determined that the flight was properly dispatched from Buffalo, the question arises as to whether Captain Cooper complied with the requirements of his flight plan and clearance. The evidence so indicates. Flight 1 reported that it was over Jarvis, Ontario, which is directly on the course, at 9:39 p.m., approximately on time, cruising at 4000 feet and estimated arrival at the Florence intersection at 10:20 p.m. This radio message was not only received by the Detroit station but was intercepted by American's Buffalo and Chicago stations, who, according to normal procedure, have a receiver tuned to the same frequency as Flight 1 and record all messages intercepted. A few minutes later at 9:44 p.m. Flight 1 was again in contact with the Detroit station, at which time the captain was advised that, since weather conditions beyond Detroit had not changed, continuance of the flight beyond that point was doubtful. An examination of the radio records of these stations introduced at the hearing showed the time as well as the exact context of the messages sent and received by Flight 1. The evidence is clear that at no time during the radio conversations did either the captain or first officer indicate that anything was wrong on board the airplane. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the flight was proceeding normally at 9:44 p.m., the time of the last radio contact.

An examination of timepieces found in the wreckage, together with the testimony of witnesses, indicates that the accident occurred about 10:10 p.m., 26 minutes after the last radio contact. Since Flight 1 had reported over Jarvis at its proper altitude and approximately on time, and the time estimated for arrival over the Florence intersection seemed normal, there was no reason for the ground stations to become concerned with the flight until after it was due over the Florence intersection, at which time another report would be expected. Unless the captain or the ground stations have information to transmit to each other, radio contacts with the ground are made only upon arrival over pre-designated positions as the flight progresses along the airway.

Inquiry was made into the possibility of deviation from the normal course between the time that the airplane passed over Jarvis and the time that it arrived in the vicinity of the point where the accident occurred. A number of persons who lived along the airway between Jarvis and the scene of the accident were contacted but none recalled seeing or hearing the airplane pass over. This could be attributed to the fact that it was night and also that numerous aircraft are constantly flying over this area night and day. However, other evidence accumulated during the investigation indicates that the airplane was on its course and at its proper altitude. This conclusion is reached by taking into consideration the time of the last radio position report, the distance covered by the airplane at the time it was observed over the vicinity of St. Thomas, the cruising speed of the airplane, and winds encountered. Moreover, the accident occurred on the airway and approximately 1½ miles