Page:CAB Accident Report, AAXICO Logair Flight 1416B.pdf/10

- 10 - miles visibility in light rain." Actually the tower controller transmission, recorded at 0600, indicates the visibility was given as 10 miles. Visibility to the south was restricted due to the storm moving across the approach end of runway 36 but this information was not provided to the crew.

According to the crew the approach from the outer marker was made utilizing the ILS glide slope and localizer. The crew testimony indicated that with reference to cockpit intruments the aircraft was on the localizer making a normal approach except that they were, "About one dot high on the glide slope." The approach was continued until the altimeters indicated approximately 1,150 feet at which time the first officer called out, "Minimums, let's go around." The crew testified that misapproach procedures were initiated and shortly therafter impact with the trees occurred.

The first tree that the aircraft struck was 740 feet to the right of the localizer (runway) centerline. The ILS glide slope centerline passes approximately 225 feet above the height of the top of the tree. An aircraft on the localizer and on the glide slope with the indicator indicating one dot high, would be approximately 30 feet above the glide slope centerline. The aircraft would be expected to clear the tree vertically by approximately 255 feet and laterally by 740 feet. The aircraft's altitude at this time would be 1,152 feet m.s.l., (elevation at the tree top was 896 feet). In addition, the settings found on the captain's and first officer's altimeters, 29.88 and 29.89, respectively, in lieu of the setting given by the tower controller (29.92), would add an additional 30 to 40 feet to the actual altitude of the aircraft.

At the time the crew states that they had reached 1,150 feet and were executing the missed approach procedure the aircraft's position with relation to the tree sould have been 740 feet to the left (west) slightly south, and approximately 290 feet above it. From this position the Board considers it impossible for the aircraft to hit the tree in a wings level, slightly noseup attitude with a 7.3-degree angle of descent.

The crew testified that the ILS was being utilized in conjunction with the approach and that they were on the localizer course and slightly above the glide slope at the time the go-around was initiated, just prior to contact with the tree. However, based on the examination of all physical evidence it is apparent that fully scale deflectios of the localizer and glide slope indicators (full left - full-up) would have been displayed on the instrument at this point. It is, therefore, believed that the ILS was not being utilized in the manner stated by the crew and that a go-around was not initiated until the aircraft had descended well below the ILS minimums.

It is believed that when the aircraft entered the area of heavy rain and visibility deterioration the captain allowed the aircraft to descend lower than intended in an unsuccessful attempt to maintain visual contact with the ground. When visual contact was again established it was at an altitude too low to avoid striking the trees.

The impact heading of 20 degrees magnetic, in lieu of the runway heading of 360 degrees, can be accounted for by an attempt on the part of the captain to bring the aircraft into the clear area which he knew existed to the cast of Whiteman AFB or through the intuition of a illisible approach.