Page:CAB Accident Report, 1963 Purdue Aeronautics Corporation crash.pdf/6

 VOR station and the "Deck" fix was raised from 2,400 to 2,700 feet m.s.1. An FAA witness testified that the terrain altitude information used to prepare the original VOR/DME approach plate was taken from a U. S. Geological Survey quadrangle chart dated 1931. During the investigation of this accident the FAA became aware that more recent charts depicted higher terrain elevations in the approach area at Morgantown. As a result of this information and the observation of higher than reported terrain in the area between the VCR and the airport, the minimum altitudes were corrected to their present values.

FAA witnesses further testified that the minimum crossing altitude at the VOR station was increased from 3,000 feet to 3,300 feet m.3.1. under the provision of Civil Air Regulations (CAR) amendment 60.21/29. CAR 60.21/29 was promulgated by the Administrator to provide an additional 500 feet of VFR air space below the floor of controlled airspaces for use by VFR flights.

Following this accident the C&GS VOR/DME approach plate for Morgantown was changed to reflect the higher minimum altitudes. Additionally, "VOR/DME" was printed on the face of the chart above the note that indicates the "... approach authorized only for aircraft with installed operational VOR and DME equipment." The approach plate used by the carrier had, and still has, a "Note 1. If aircraft not equipped with operational VOR and DME equipment procedure not authorized. The captain stated that he did not see this note until after the accident occurred.

The crew testified that they had adequate rest before the flight and that neither of them had taken any medications or been under a doctor's care before takeoff.

Analysis There was no malfunction of the aircraft, powerplants, or aircraft systems that contributed to the cause of this accident. The weight and balance of the aircraft was within limits. The navigational equipment, both on the ground and 11 the aircraft was operational without malfunctions. The crew was current and properly certificated for the flight and their physical condition was not considered a factor.

The weather services provided the crew and controller were timely and adequate At the time the approach was attempted the weather was satisfactory for either an ADF or a VOR/DME approach; however, it was below minimums for a VOR approach.

Confusion in the captain's mind as to the meaning of the designation VOR/DME on the chart, coupled with his lack of familiarity with the type of charts furnished for his use, led num to select an approach procedure for which the aircraft was not instrumented. He did not recall ever receiving any instructions in the use of this particular type of approach chart and had apparently limited experience 15 their use. The approach plates had been authorized for use by the FAA. All the required information, including a note that operational DME equipment was required in the aircraft, was displayed on the face of the chart. However, either due to the location or format of the note the captain did not see it. It is noted that the FAA controller made the same type of error when he selected the C&GS VOR/DME chart to verify the minimums for the VOR approach prior to issuing the crew a clearance for a VOR approach. The Board believes that had the controller noted this dis-