Page:CAB Accident Report, 1945 Page Airways Accident.pdf/6

 from ten minutes before the accident to five minutes after it the wind was from an average northwest direction, fluctuating from 20 to 25 m.p.h. with gusts from 18 to 38 m.p.h. A strong gust occurring coincidentally with the power loss could have caused the yawing to the left.

Previous failures of valve spring washers of this type had been experienced on other engines of this make and model. There were two models of the subject washer of slightly differing dimensions and other characteristics which here known to have failed. Army, Navy and other known users of this engine had this matter called to their attention by Wright Aeronautical Corporation. On February 27, 1943, the Army took corrective action by issuing a technical order for the replacement of one of these aforementioned types. On November 13, 1943, the Navy took corrective action in reference to both types. The failed washer was of the type which the Army Air Forces did not undertake to replace. Subsequent to this accident Wright Aeronautical Corporation issued a bulletin on identification of existing defective washers and recommended their immediate replacement with a later type.

A number of witnesses observed smoke and flame coming from the aircraft during the take-off climb. This is a natural result of this type of engine failure which causes malfunctioning of both the induction and exhaust systems. Also, torching resulted from the sudden throttling of both engines which were being operated on a take-off rich mixture.

At the time Captain Decker realized the loss of power he had about 30 feet of altitude, about 95 m.p.h. airspeed and about 2700 feet of usable remaining runway. There were therethree [sic] possibilities which the pilot could have tried: - continue flight on one engine, land with wheels up or land with wheels down. He elected to do the latter. First contact with the ground was made at a speed and in an attitude which prevented the maintenance of continuous ground contact with a resultant loss of braking. This condition was undoubtedly aggravated by the unusual gustiness. Furthermore, the application of the flaps after the first ground contact could and probably did cause the aircraft to stay in the air longer than it otherwise would have, thereby further lessening braking distance.

With all the foregoing facts and considerations in mind, the Board finds that:

l. The aircraft was properly certificated for day operation but had departed from Miami before sunrise.

2. The pilots were properly certificated and rated.

3. The aircraft was loaded above the maximum allowable weight on leaving Miami. The exact weight on leaving Washington could not be determined due to Page's failure to keep an adequate loading schedule.

Rh