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 7. U.S. Person 1 is a United States citizen and an American political operative. BUTINA established contact with U.S. Person 1 in Moscow in or around 2013. U.S. Person 1 worked with BUTINA to jointly arrange introductions to U.S. persons having influence in American politics, including an organization promoting gun rights (hereinafter "GUN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION"), for the purpose of advancing the agenda of the Russian Federation.

8. U.S. Person 2 is a United States citizen who was included among the participants in a series of email communications in 2016 and 2017 that reveal BUTINA's efforts to arrange a series of dinners in the District of Columbia and New York City involving Russian nationals and U.S. persons having influence in American politics (hereinafter "friendship and dialogue dinners"). BUTINA told U.S. Person 2 that the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL was "very much impressed by you" and that "the Russians will support the efforts from our side."

9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA) is the Russian government agency with primary responsibility for the Russian Federation's foreign relations and foreign policy.

10. The Russian Federation, or Russia, is one of the leading state intelligence threats to U.S. interests, based on its capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope. Penetrating the U.S. national decision-making apparatus and the Intelligence Community are primary objectives for numerous foreign intelligence entities, including Russia. The objective of the Russian Federation leadership is to expand its sphere of influence and strength, and it targets the United States and U.S. allies to further that goal.

11. Russian influence operations are a threat to U.S. interests as they are low-cost, relatively low-risk, and deniable ways to shape foreign perceptions and to influence populations. Moscow seeks to create wedges that reduce trust and confidence in democratic processes, degrade