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Rh as it appeared more than 75 years ago in Sutherland’s book on statutory construction, says that “when a statute refers to a general subject, the statute adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises.” Ante, at 9 (citing 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§5207–5208 (3d ed. 1943); emphasis added).

But a canon is at most a rule of thumb. Indeed, Sutherland himself says that “[n]o single canon of interpretation can purport to give a certain and unerring answer.” 2 Sutherland, supra, §4501, p. 316. And hornbooks, summarizing case law, have long explained that whether a reference statute adopts the law as it stands on the date of enactment or includes subsequent changes in the law to which it refers is “fundamentally a question of legislative intent and purpose.” Fox, Effect of Modification or Repeal of Constitutional or Statutory Provision Adopted by Reference in Another Provision, 168 A. L. R. 627, 628 (1947); see also 82 C. J. S., Statutes §485, p. 637 (2009) (“The question of whether a statute which has adopted another statute by reference will be affected by amendments made to the adopted statute is one of legislative intent and purpose”); id., at 638 (statute that refers generally to another body of law will ordinarily include subsequent changes in the adopted law only “as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute”).

Thus, all interpretive roads here lead us to the same place, namely, to context, to history, to purpose, and to consequences. Language alone cannot resolve the statute’s linguistic ambiguity.

“Statutory interpretation,” however, “is not a game of blind man’s bluff.” Dole Food Co., 538 U. S., at 484 (, concurring in part and dissenting in part). We are “free to consider statutory language in light of a