Page:Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health System, Inc.pdf/3

 Ultimately, a black eschar (dead and sloughing tissue) developed at her neck and chest. On May 18, 2006, Broussard was admitted to the Hillcrest Burn Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. There, she underwent removal of "pigskin" and received skin grafts.

Broussard sued St. Edward Mercy Health System, Inc., d/b/a St. Edward Mercy Medical Center Sisters of Mercy Health System, St. Louis, Inc., Dr. Seffense, Dr. Coleman, Jr., and the nurses and technicians present in the operating room. While Broussard's notice of appeal indicates that she is appealing summary judgment entered in favor of St. Edward, she has limited her arguments on appeal to the alleged liability of Dr. Seffense and Dr. Coleman, Jr.. She has, therefore, abandoned all claims on appeal except those against Dr. Seffense and Dr. Coleman, Jr.

The circuit court decided the constitutionality of section 16-114-206(a) in the context of a motion for summary judgment. Generally, in reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidence presented in support of summary judgment leaves a material question of fact unanswered. ''DaimlerChrysler Servs. N. Am., LLC v. Weiss'', 360 Ark. 188, 192–93, 200 S.W.3d 405, 407 (2004). However, this summary-judgment motion was decided based on the circuit court's decision on the constitutionality of section 16-114-206(a). The question of the correct application and interpretation of an Arkansas statute is a question of law, which this court decides de novo. DaimlerChrysler, 360 Ark. at 193, 200 S.W.3d at 407.

The circuit court found section 16-114-206(a) constitutional in that it "establishes