Page:Brief for the United States, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).djvu/64

 in possession of the heroin for a substantial interval of time sufficient to bring into effect the statutory presumption of guilty knowledge derived from possession. Petitioner's reliance (Pet. Br. 28) on United States v. Landry, 257 F. 2d 425 (C.A. 7), is misplaced. Landry's admission was rejected, not for lack of corroboration, but for its failure to prove what it sought to prove, i.e., possession (id., 431). The government there adduced an admission by the defendant that he owned the narcotics that were found in the possession of another person (id., pp. 430–431). But the statute required possession rather than ownership in order to raise a prima facie presumption of a violation. Here that issue is not present—Wong Sun's confession admitted transportation of the heroin from Bill to Toy and to Yee and a fortiori the confession admitted the possession intrinsic in such transportation.

Every necessary element of Wong Sun's offense was thus proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the procedure approved in Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (supra, p. 52)—"the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused".

Toy's confession, unlike that of Wong Sun, shows deliberate and ingenious effort on his part to withhold some of the facts. Like the accused in Opper v. United States, supra, 348 U.S. 84, Toy obviously sought to admit only what he thought could be proved