Page:Brief for the United States, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).djvu/49

 2d 381, 384 (C.A. D.C.), certiorari denied sub nom. O'Kelley v. United States, 326 U.S. 724.

3. Where, at the time and place of an illegal arrest or an illegal search, a defendant makes statements which are themselves evidence or which lead to other evidence, the situation lies between those we have just discussed. On the one side, the illegal official action is still occurring and its effects may, to a greater or less degree, still be operative. On the other, the statements, if not coerced, do represent an independent intervening act of free will on the part of the defendant. As Judge (later Chief Justice) Vinson said in Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F. 2d 690, 692 (C.A. D.C.), there "exists the heaviest cross-fire between the legal significance of voluntary declarations, and a completely unlawful entry into a home." It is not always easy to decide whether the statements are truly the product of the illegal government action or result from an intervening independent act of volition. But it seems clear to us that there should be no general rule barring all statements or admissions made in connection with or after an illegal arrest. For instance, if an individual arrested without probable cause while walking on a busy street blurts out at once in remorse—before the officer says anything more than "I arrest you"—that he is guilty of stealing certain goods and will make restitution, it would seem unwise to bar that