Page:Breaking the Hindenburg Line.djvu/109

Rh trenches themselves are nearly free from direct hits. There was, in fact, very little preliminary artillery preparation for the Ramicourt Battle; what little work the “heavies” did carry out being confined chiefly to the villages and such dominant features as Doon Hill and Copse, where enemy artillery was active during the later stages of the battle.

Besides the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line, the main obstacles to be overcome in the area scheduled for attack by the 46th Division were the villages of Ramicourt and Montbrehain, lesser obstacles being the networks of sunken roads lying around Neville's Cross and Ramicourt Station, together with the Beaurevoir-Montbrehain railway-line which ran transversely across the Divisional front, forming a strong convex outer defence line to Montbrehain.

The country between these strong-points was, as already stated, open and undulating, but it was unfortunate that the dominating features—hills slightly above the average in height—were on the extreme right flank of the Divisional objective. These ridges, Mannequin Hill and Doon Hill, were to play a decisive part in the enemy's resistance, particularly in assisting his strong counter-attacks towards the end of the day. Both from Mannequin Hill and Doon Hill, artillery and machine guns could fire with direct observation on the greater part of the country attacked, so that the guns on these hills caused considerable casualties long after the Infantry resistance had been overcome. Our troops were thus forced, for the sake of shelter, to take up positions with inferior opportunities for observation, and the enemy in his counter-attacks was able to infiltrate into our positions from one direction and another without much opposition. Towards the end of the day, the