Page:Bowyer v. Ducey (CV-20-02321-PXH-DJH) (2020) Order.pdf/8

 name was on the ballot is not a plaintiff in this case.

Other circuit courts to reach the issue have cited the Carson decision with disapproval, noting that there was no precedent for expanding standing in the way that it did. See Bognet v. Sec’y of [sic] Commonwealth of Pa., 980 F.3d 336, 351 n.6 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Our conclusion departs from the recent decision of an Eighth Circuit panel which, over a dissent, concluded that candidates for the position of presidential elector had standing under Bond [v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011)] to challenge a Minnesota state-court consent decree that effectively extended the receipt deadline for mailed ballots…. The Carson court appears to have cited language from Bond without considering the context—specifically, the Tenth Amendment and the reserved police powers—in which the U.S. Supreme Court employed that language. There is no precedent for expanding Bond beyond this context, and the Carson court cited none.”). Indeed, as numerous other courts have held, where, as here, the injury alleged by plaintiffs is that defendants failed to follow the Elections Clause, the Supreme Court has stated that the “injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that [courts] have refused to countenance.” Lance, 549 U.S. at 442.

Elector Plaintiffs have not established they can personally bring suit, and therefore, they do not have standing to bring Count One. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count