Page:Bowyer v. Ducey (CV-20-02321-PXH-DJH) (2020) Order.pdf/10

 of state election laws by state officials or other unidentified third parties is not always amenable to a federal constitutional claim.” Bognet, 980 F.3d at 355; see also ''Shipley v. Chicago Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1062 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A deliberate violation of state election laws by state election officials does not transgress against the Constitution.”); Powell v. Power'', 436 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1970) (rejecting Equal Protection claim where allegations of state’s erroneous counting of votes cast by voters unqualified to participate).

Additionally, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their Equal Protection Clause claim on a vote dilution theory. See Bognet, 980 F.3d at 355 (rejecting Equal Protection theory and explaining “[t]his conceptualization of vote dilution—state actors counting ballots in violation of state election law—is not a concrete harm under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also Shipley, 947 F.3d at 1062 (“A deliberate violation of state election laws by state election officials does not transgress against the Constitution”) (internal citations omitted); ''Am. Civil Rights Union v. Martinez-Rivera'', 166 F. Supp. 3d 779, 789 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (holding that allegations of “vote dilution” as a result of alleged voting process irregulates “[are] speculative and, as such, are more akin to a generalized grievance about the government than an injury in fact.”); Powell, 436 F.2d at 88 (rejecting Equal Protection Clause claim arising from state’s erroneous counting of votes cast by voters unqualified to participate in closed primary); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) (“It was not intended by the Fourteenth Amendment… that all matters formerly within the exclusive cognizance of the states should become matters of national concern.”).

Setting aside that Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the election are not viable vote dilution claims, Plaintiffs also have not requested relief that is redressable in a tailored way as is required. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934 (“A plaintiff’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff’s particular injury.”); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (“The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”). Therefore, even if Plaintiffs could somehow establish that