Page:Bostock v. Clayton County (2020).pdf/28

24 This Court has explained many times over many years that, when the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end. The people are entitled to rely on the law as written, without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms based on some extratextual consideration. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 387 (2009); ''Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992); Rubin v. United States'', 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981). Of course, some Members of this Court have consulted legislative history when interpreting ambiguous statutory language. Cf. (, dissenting). But that has no bearing here. “Legislative history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.” Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574 (2011). And as we have seen, no ambiguity exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts before us. To be sure, the statute’s application in these cases reaches “beyond the principal evil” legislators may have intended or expected to address. Oncale, 523 U. S., at 79. But the fact that [a statute] has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity; instead, it simply demonstrates [the] breadth of a legislative command. Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499 (1985). And “it is ultimately the provisions of” those legislative commands “rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 79; see also A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012) (noting that unexpected applications of broad language reflect only Congress’s “presumed point [to] produce general coverage—not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc exceptions”).

Still, while legislative history can never defeat unambiguous statutory text, historical sources can be useful for a different purpose: Because the law’s ordinary meaning at the time of enactment usually governs, we must be sensitive to the possibility a statutory term that means one thing