Page:Bostock v. Clayton County (2020).pdf/152

8 *The Court refused a reading of “mineral deposits” that would include water, even if “water is a ‘mineral,’ in the broadest sense of that word,” because it would bring about a “major ... alteration in established legal relationships based on nothing more than an overly literal reading of a statute, without any regard for its context or history.” Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U. S. 604, 610, 616 (1978). Those cases exemplify a deeply rooted principle: When there is a divide between the literal meaning and the ordinary meaning, courts must follow the ordinary meaning. Next is a critical point of emphasis in this case. The difference between literal and ordinary meaning becomes especially important when—as in this case—judges consider phrases in statutes. (Recall that the shorthand version of the phrase at issue here is “discriminate because of sex.”)
 * The Court declined to interpret “facilitating” a drug distribution crime in a way that would cover purchasing drugs, because the “literal sweep of ‘facilitate’ sits uncomfortably with common usage.” Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U. S. 816, 820 (2009).
 * The Court rebuffed a literal reading of “personnel rules” that would encompass any rules that personnel must follow (as opposed to human resources rules about personnel), and stated that no one “using ordinary language would describe” personnel rules “in this manner.” Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 578 (2011).
 * The Court explained that, when construing statutory phrases such as “arising from,” it avoids “uncritical literalism leading to results that no sensible person could have intended.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 9–10) (internal quotation marks omitted).