Page:Borden v. State ex rel. Robinson.pdf/39

Rh their territorial limits, which of itself, without notice, confers sufficient jurisdiction over the person of the defendant to uphold the judgment at least until reversed for error. Unless we could suppose that the citizen is bound to take notice of the proceedings of courts, as they are of public laws, this amounts to saying that their rights may be passed upon and their property taken by judicial determination imheard and undefended by them, and if this rule is to prevail in civil proceedings, where the rights of property is involved (saving perhaps some additional constitutional protection) it is difficult to see why life, liberty and reputation may not also be sacrificed under it; for I think I can show that all of these are natural inherent rights and so closely connected that they must stand or fall together.

That life and liberty preceded the right to property (as asserted) is a matter of but little moment. Concede it to be true that the right to hold and enjoy the use of property to the exclusion of others, that it grew up with and not before organized society, still the use of the one is so connected with the enjoyment of the other, that to impair or abridge the one materially affects if it does not destroy the other. When the means necessary to support life are withdrawn, it is a mockery to say that life is protected or secured. Without however entering into a metaphysical disquisition as to whether the right to be notified and afforded an opportunity to defend the one or the other is a natural or a conventional right, I will content myself with a reference to authorities of acknowledged weight.

In Rex vs. Cleg, 1 ''Str. R.'' 475, J. said, "It is certain that natural justice requires that no man should be condemned without notice."

In Bloom vs. Burdick, 1 Hill R. 139, J. said, "It is a cardinal principle in the administration of justice that no man can be condemned or divested of his rights until he has had the opportunity of being heard."

In Bustard vs. Gates and wife, 4 Dana R. 435, C. J. said, "It is a general rule of the common law and of common sense, as well as of common justice, that a court has no