Page:Borden v. State ex rel. Robinson.pdf/23

Rh And this seems clear from the remark of Mr. Justice  in delivering the opinion of the court in McCormick vs. Sullivan, (10 Wheaton 192) that these courts "are all of limited jurisdiction; but they are not on that account inferior courts, in the technical sense of those words, whose judgments taken alone are to be disregarded." And then by the remarks of Mr. Justice in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of The Bank of the United States vs. Moss et al. (6 Howard's U. S. R. 40,) when combating the idea that the judgment of these courts, when jurisdiction was not alleged, were nullities, "That this view is supported by the English doctrine. There though judgments of inferior courts or commissions are often void, when on their face clearly without their jurisdiction and may be proved to be so and avoided without writ of error, (3 Bac. Ab. Error A. 10 Coke 77, a. Hawk. P. C. ch. 50, sec. 3,) yet the judgment of a superior court is not void, but only voidable by plea on error." ''Bac. Ab. Void and Voidable, C. 2 Salk.'' 674. Carth. 276.

Nor is this remark of any the less force in showing the ground upon which these doctrines rest (that of the distinction between superior and inferior courts as to the conclusiveness of their judgments until reversed) that the particular case upon which Judge Woodbury was remarking had been tried upon the merits, because the principle is the same whether the judgment was rendered upon default or after the trial of issues of fact. No distinction as to this is to be found in any English case; nor indeed could it seem to have any existence any where unless it would be conceded that consent could give to a court jurisdiction of a subject matter that had not been committed to it by law.

If then this rule as to the validity of the judgments of a superior court will in some cases override the undoubted rule that to authorize a judgment the court must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, so far, in some cases, as not only to prevent the consequences of the judgment being held void that was rendered by a court having no jurisdiction at all over the subject matter, but actually to make such judgment perpetually good against all the world, as in cases where the court was