Page:Borden v. State ex rel. Robinson.pdf/10

528 The same author defines "Justice in a judicial sense" to be "nothing more or less than exact conformity to some obligatory law;" and therefore he says that "all human actions are either just or unjust as they are in conformity to or in opposition to law." The doing of justice then in a judicial sense is the performance towards another of whatever is due to him in virtue of a perfect and rigorous right, the execution of which he may demand by forcible means unless we satisfy him freely and with good will. While, on the other hand, the performance of duties due to another only in virtue of an imperfect or non-rigorous obligation which cannot be insisted on by violent methods, but the fulfilling of which is left to each man's honor and conscience, are comprehended under humanity, charity or benevolence in opposition to justice.

Now according to these principles and definition which we have laid down from an author of the most unquestionable authority on these points, if it be contrary to natural justice that a man should be condemned without notice—and an opportunity to be heard, as is said by Fortesque, such is because it is a principle of natural law, as is said by Judge Marshall, that before the right of an individual can be bound by a judicial sentence he shall have notice actual or constructive of the proceedings against him. Because otherwise there could be no non-conformity to an obligatory law to bring such a human action within the definition of injustice. Such a natural law then is assumed by the remark of Fortesque and its existence is affirmatively asserted by Judge Marshall with the further remark that it is of "universal obligation."

We would feel that it was presumption in us even indirectly to gainsay these great authorities, if we did not feel sure that they did not use these expressions in a scholastic sense, but only in that loose and general sense in which strong language is often used to affirm the existence of any highly important general rule of very extensive application. We feel therefore, in what we shall say on this point, that there is more of vindication from