Page:Boland v. Raffensperger (2020CV343018) (2020) Final Order.pdf/3

 (B) The person or persons whose eligibility to seek any nomination or office in a run-off primary or election is contested;

(C) The election superintendent or superintendents who conducted the contested primary or election; or

(D) The public officer who formally declared the number of votes for and against any question submitted to electors at an election. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-520(2).

The Secretary of State is not one of these statutorily proscribed defendants, nor are the members of the State Election Board. They are not candidates for the office that is the subject of the contest, so neither subsections (A) nor (B) apply of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-520(2). The State Defendants are also not one or more of “the election superintendent[s]” who conducted the contested election, therefor subsection (C) does not apply. Finally, because the Plaintiff has not asserted any claims regarding the constitutional amendments or the taxation issue put to the voters statewide, which were the only questions submitted to the voters statewide in the November 3, 2020 general election, subsection (D) is also inapplicable. As such, the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to name the proper Defendants is GRANTED as to State Defendants.

Second, Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the equitable doctrines of laches, which bars a claim when (1) the lapse of time and (2) the claimant’s neglect in asserting rights (3) prejudiced the adverse party. Waller v. Golden, 288 Ga. 595, 597 (2011). All three elements are satisfied here, where Plaintiff challenges the validity of the presidential election after it has already been conducted based on procedures which were adopted long before the election and upon which elections officials and voters alike relied.