Page:Bobby James Moore v. Texas.pdf/13

2 the Court of Criminal Appeals for “rel[ying] less upon the adaptive deficits… than upon Moore’s apparent adaptive strengths,” ante, at 6–7, and for “rel[ying] heavily upon adaptive improvements made in prison,” ante, at 8. But in Moore, we said only that a court ought not “overemphasiz[e]” adaptive strengths or place too much “stres[s]” on improved behavior in prison. This left “the line between the permissible–consideration, maybe even emphasis–and the forbidden–‘overemphasis’–… not only thin, but totally undefined….” Moore, 581 U. S., at ___ (, dissenting) (slip op., at 11). The majority’s belief that the state court failed to follow Moore on remand merely proves that “[n]either the Court’s articulation of this standard [in Moore] nor its application sheds any light on what it means.” Id., at ___ (, dissenting) (slip op., at 10).

Having concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals failed to apply the standard allegedly set out in Moore, the Court today takes it upon itself to correct these factual findings and reverse the judgment. This is not our role. “We do not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 227 (1925); see also Salazar-Limon v. Houston, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (, concurring in denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 2) (“[W]e rarely grant review where the thrust of the claim is that a lower court simply erred in applying a settled rule of law to the facts of a particular case”). If the Court is convinced that the Court of Criminal Appeals made a legal error, it should vacate the