Page:Board of Trustees of University of Arkansas v. Andrews.pdf/17

 Fifth, the majority states that "under the doctrine of stare decisis, we cannot ignore six decades of this court's precedent prior to Staton." However, the same can be said with regard to our over twenty years of precedent set forth in Staton and Tedder. In Chamberlin v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 343 Ark. 392, 36 S.W.3d 281 (2001), this court described the dictates of stare decisis as follows:

"Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we are bound to follow prior case law. The policy of stare decisis is designed to lend predictability and stability to the law. It is well-settled that "[p]recedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable." Our test is whether adherence to the rule would result in "great injury or injustice.""

(Internal citations omitted.) Pursuant to Chamberlain, the majority has failed to demonstrate that our precedent set forth in Staton is "patently wrong" or "manifestly unjust." Instead, the majority's decision, in a perfunctory fashion, overhauls over twenty years of our well-established law on sovereign immunity and has effectively revived the antiquated doctrine that "the king can do no wrong." By focusing solely on Staton and Tedder, the majority's