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1888.] fied himself that his business was inadequately insured, and that there were special dangers of a conflagration, in consequence of inflammable materials lying all about in the neighbourhood, yet declined to take the proper steps to effect a reasonable insurance for fear of being accused of panic and called an alarmist? Should we not say that he was weak-minded, short-sighted, and blind to his own interests, and that he deserved a disaster?

The British nation has been told by all its best and most thoughtful naval officers that the naval forces of the country are inadequate for its defence. They turn, then, to their politicians, and they ask the present parliamentary chief of the navy what his opinion is; and he tells them plainly that he also does not think the navy is strong enough: he, justly we admit, lays the blame of this deficiency at the doors of his predecessors, who mismanaged the Admiralty and the dockyards, and failed to get full value for their money. He says also that under his management this will all be altered, and that under the arrangements which he and his colleagues have made, the navy will in future be worked on sound business principles, and full value received for every penny expended. This would be very cheerful and encouraging news for the British public if it were not for the fact that it is somewhat discounted in the minds of all those whose memories carry them back to exactly similar charges and similar promises which have been made by every political chief of the navy who has been in office for the last thirty years.

It has been shown that seamen and politicians alike are agreed as to the fact that the navy is not strong enough to meet the requirements of the country. As to how much it ought to be increased, there will probably be considerable divergence of opinion, not only as between the seamen and the politicians, but amongst the seamen themselves; and, indeed, it is only natural that it should be so, seeing that there is a considerable diversity of opinion amongst them as to the respective values of the individual ships in our own and foreign navies; but it is probable that the phrase, "large increase" or "considerable increase," would cover all their views.

We now come to a very important point in the controversy – viz., how soon ought this increase to be effected? Should it be done at once, and without a day's delay? or is it wiser to put it off and do it gradually? We are all, no doubt, agreed with Lord George Hamilton when he says that the expenditure of one day does not mean the efficiency of the next day. But it is equally indisputable that the longer you put off commencing to build a ship, the longer it will be before she is completed. And how are we to reconcile the admission that the navy is not strong enough, with the policy of discharging dockyard men, cutting down the navy estimates, and failing to lay down any more ironclads?

It would seem to ordinary minds that if the navy is admitted to be too weak, – if, moreover, the safety of the country depends upon its being strong enough, – and if the most far-seeing statesman would hesitate to name the year or the month which it might be called upon to put forth its strength and fight for the nation's existence, – that the wise and pro-