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288 absence of any intelligent system of naval administration, as disclosed by the evidence of Sir Arthur Hood before the Select Committee on the Navy Estimates, was in striking contrast with "The Higher Policy of Defence," as set forth in a most able article in the 'Times' of May 25, 1888.

That article, contributed by an anonymous correspondent, is founded on, and evidently called forth by, a paper read at the Royal United Service Institution a few days previously by Admiral Colomb, entitled "The Naval Defences of the United Kingdom." Both Admiral Colomb's paper and the anonymous article deal with the same subject (though from a slightly different point of view) in a masterly and comprehensive manner.

Did space permit we should like to quote largely from both; but though this is impossible, we must trouble our readers with one quotation from "The Higher Policy of Defence," as it bears directly on the point for which we are contending, and supports our views in the clearest and most forcible language: –

"On all grounds, therefore, it is de- sirable to place the demands put forward in relation to the defences of the empire on a fair and intelligible basis. No amount of ingenuity in matters of detail can ever atone for the defects of a scheme of which the fundamental conception is wrong. No tactical skill can avert the evils resulting from a plan of campaign which is strategically faulty. We have on many occasions shown a ten- dency to approach questions both large and small from the wrong end, and it is not difficult to ascertain the cause. Master-minds are necessarily rare. Able and zealous experts, ca- pable of holding a brief with much show of force, abound. The balance is supposed to be held by a civilian Minister, who of necessity knows

nothing about the matter. The qual- ities which lead a statesman to Cab- inet rank in this country, are tending less and less in the direction which the right government of a great em- pire demands. Good debating power, mastery of the details of local govern- ment or of finance, capacity for work, all these things are not only compat- ible with a total inability to under- stand the broad aspects of great military problems, but they may be associated with complete incompetence in the mere administrative work of a War Office or Admiralty. And it is possible to arrive at the head of either even without the possession of one of the attributes enumerated. Pitt could grasp and direct a vast military scheme. Palmerston was naturally gifted with something of a soldier's genius. But of the public men of recent times, how many have aimed at the elementary proposition that the richest empire in the world must needs be strong or perish, and that to weld the scattered members into one great whole, capable of acting as such against a common enemy, is a problem worth the labour of a life? Political distinction being obtainable at an infinitely cheaper rate, involving no slightest study of the relative strength of the great Powers, no thought of the solution of the complex problem of imperial defence, the result is not to be wondered at. Under such conditions it is inevitable that what may well be termed the higher policy of defence has been palpably for- gotten."

The above is weighty evidence against our present system of making the navy estimates dance attendance upon party interests. But the worst of it is, that there can be no absolute proof that the system is wrong, unless war and disaster come upon the nation. As long as peace lasts, our optimists can point to facts, and tell us that the system works very well on the whole. They can say that it has ensured us eighty years of maritime peace and prosperity; and they can argue that if our