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1888.] phasised by officials who are endeavouring to defend themselves from the just indignation of the country, is composed of ships very properly designated as "obsolete," and armed with old-fashioned and inferior weapons.

In fast cruisers, also, we are so lamentably deficient that the defenders of our present naval policy have had the startling effrontery to declare that we cannot expect to be able to protect our commerce, but must be content to see it pass under a neutral flag directly war is declared with a maritime Power. This truly humiliating acknowledgment has probably done more than all the preaching of the so-called alarmists to awaken the minds of our merchants and shipowners, and to cause them to ask themselves what this really means to them. The answer is, that it means ruin – ruin not only to them, but to the country at large. It means defeat pure and simple, national humiliation, the loss of empire, and such widespread misery, starvation, and social convulsions, that the mere contemplation of such things ought to be sufficient to cause a free and self-governing country to insist that the Government of the day, regardless of party politics, should take such steps as will put such a terrible national collapse outside the region of reasonable probabilities.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Hornby recently read a paper before the London Chamber of Commerce, in which he pointed out the duties which our cruisers would be expected to perform in case we were at war with a maritime Power; and he gave the number of ships of a certain speed, which, in his judgment, would be necessary to perform those duties. A few days afterwards the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the House of Commons, replied to Sir Geoffrey Hornby by saying that he disagreed with him in his views as to how our commerce should be protected, and that the ships he wanted would cost too much money. Let us just consider for one moment the respective authority with which these two men speak. Sir Geoffrey Hornby is an officer who has commanded more fleets and squadrons than any man alive; he has performed successfully bolder manœuvres with ironclad fleets than have ever been attempted before or since; he has spent his whole life at sea; he is admitted on all hands to be a clear-headed and able strategist; and it is not too much to say that he is looked upon, not only in this country, but probably in all Europe, as the greatest living authority on naval subjects. Lord George Hamilton is an able statesman, who, with all his ability and conscientious desire to promote the highest efficiency of the department under him, can scarcely have been able to afford much of his time for the study of naval strategy, or the all-important question of how our commerce should be safeguarded in time of war. Which of these, we ask, should the country listen to on such a subject?

Moreover, is it true to say that the ships asked for by Sir Geoffrey Hornby would cost too much money? Who are the proper judges upon this point? Has the question, with its alternative, ever been put before the country? We are convinced that it never has been properly so put; and when it is, there can be little doubt about the answer. It may well be that Ministers have made up their minds that the country would not face the expenditure necessary