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1885.] light and apart from political considerations, thus sums up the conditions of a sufficient frontier: –

"Looking at the northern half of this part of our territory, I think we should be thankful for possessing a frontier so easily rendered impregnable. Looking at the southern half, we have no less reason to be thankful for having acquired, in Quetta, such means of vigorous and effective action, and such an opportunity of securing new advantages of the most important and decisive kind. With a garrison strongly posted in its lines at Candahar, with all the routes and stages by which our forces might be assembled on that point, all sources of supply and all arrangements for transport, laid down as our trained staff officers are certainly capable of laying them down, we might view calmly any possible complications before us, whether arising from the augmented military power of Russia in the East, from the success of her intrigues, or from her open hostility. The grounds of our assurance would be manifest and easily understood, our native subjects would soon learn to appreciate them, and what would be security for us would be tranquillity for India."

If we have to again advance to the Helmund – and it rests at present with Mr Gladstone to show how our position in India is to be secured if we do not – Southern Afghanistan will to all intents be lopped off from Cabul. We may do all that we can to preserve the semblance of the Ameer's authority there, but it is inevitable that the province of Candahar will soon, to all intents, become as much a part of British Indian territory as Gwalior or Indore. The Ameer will thus find himself confined to his Cabul dominions, and occupying a by no means enviable position between two Powers, both of whom will distrust him, and with both of whom he must perforce keep on terms. One consolation Abdurrahman will doubtless be able to extract from the situation: he will now enjoy subsidies from two Powers instead of from one, and the Russian roubles will not be less welcome to the Afghan mind that they may perhaps be supplied secretly and in contravention of agreement. Whatever promises Abdurrahman may have made at Rawul Pindi, and however much he might value an exclusive alliance with British India, were Russia on the other side of the Oxus, he must, now that Muscovite garrisons are hanging on his border, cultivate the good graces of the Czar's Government. It is idle to repose faith on Afghan fidelity; and we may feel assured that the Ameer of Cabul will recoup himself for loss of territory by accepting subsidies from both sides, and by cheating both as much as he can contrive to. His willingness to accede to Mr Gladstone's surrender of part of his territory is a not uncertain indication of his perception of the necessity of keeping on good terms with his new neighbour. He will find, however, that Russia is indulgent to treachery only when it is practised by herself, and that she is accustomed to receive a higher interest upon political investments of her capital than Britain has been wont to claim. No treaties, conventions, agreements, or arrangements of any nature that Mr Gladstone and M. de Giers may devise, can prevent the Afghan sovereignty from speedy and complete extinction, as a direct result of the present entanglement.

It would be idle at this juncture to speculate as to what may be done between the negotiators with regard to Herat. From what has been already arranged, it would not be unjust to conclude that it is to be left under Afghan government until it suits the convenience of Rus-