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1885.] of Russia, – that England would not move if Russia did not?'" The tone which we adopted on that occasion led to another of those long and delusive memorandums on the subject of Russia by which Prince Gortschakoff, when beaten on one line, transferred the scene of action to a new one. He declared that the circular of 1864, which had been ostensibly published as an assurance of the limited and moderate aims of Russian action, had "excluded the possibility of any interpretation implying an engagement contracted by Russia towards Europe or with any individual Power." No doubt there was no engagement in the sense of a treaty, but there had been such assurances given, coupled with such explanations as constituted a strong obligation on the part of Russia to keep the faith which had been implied in these. The Gortschakoff Memorandum of 1875 offered a historical apology for Russia's part on all the subjects of Central Asian debate between her and England during the previous eleven years; and in the despatch which accompanied it, Prince Gortschakoff made the following declaration of the Czar's policy: –

"His Imperial Majesty has no intention of extending the frontiers of Russia such as they at present exist in Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara or on the side of Krasnovodsk and of the Attrek. We have no inducement to do so. On the contrary, the Emperor deems any extension of our frontiers in those parts as being opposed to our own interests. We shall cause those frontiers to be respected, and shall protect our commerce; we shall punish any act of violence and pillage in such a manner as to prevent their recurrence; we shall endeavour to extirpate brigandage, and to establish the security of our possessions."

We have quoted this statement because it sums up in a few words the policy which Russia has followed in Central Asia. She has no intention of advancing according to her own account, but she will not adopt a frontier which would enable her to rest. Extension of territory she has always declared to be opposed to her own interests, and yet as often as she has made this declaration she has extended her territory still further. And at the same time she always indicates the defence behind which she can shelter herself when her word has again been violated. She must protect her frontiers and her commerce, and restrain violence and pillage. Well, all this can be done without annexation; we ourselves have for more than thirty years shown her how such a task is to be achieved on our Afghan frontier. It is this policy as enunciated and defended by Prince Gortschakoff that has led her to Herat; that would lead her to Cabul and Candahar, to the Khyber and the Bolan; and might in the end lead her to the Bay of Bengal, if she were allowed to take up these intermediate positions. The qualification made up by Prince Gortschakoff in the words we have quoted is wide enough to cover any aggression, any extension of territory, no matter in which direction or at the expense of what Power it is made, and yet leave Russia a loophole through which by considerable pressure her good faith and claims to consistency can be squeezed.

Prince GortschakofFs explanations when referred to Lord Salisbury met with very incisive criticism. The Marquis declared that it was "inexpedient, if not impossible, for her Majesty's Government to accept the position of inaction which Prince Gortschakoffs letter apparently wishes to force upon it, whatever may be the character of future