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556 prestige secures for us in the eyes of our Indian subjects. In somewhat less than five years, the Marquis of Ripon succeeded in breaking down that good feeling between native and European which his predecessors – especially Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Lytton – had been carefully building up ever since the conclusion of the Mutiny. The minds of the natives have been more unsettled during the last four years than during the whole previous period from the Queen's assumption of the government. Rejoicing in the licence so inconsiderately granted to it, the native press has assumed a tone towards Europeans which, however little likely to influence the educated classes, can scarcely fail to poison the minds of the masses. One of the worst features of the native press is the importance which it gives to the rivalry of Russia and Britain in the East, and the broad hints which it throws out that we who have subjugated themselves, are cowed in our turn in the presence of Russia. We could afford to overlook such language so long as Russia was as far off as Samarcand or Khiva; but with her troops almost at the gates of Herat, the case is different. The Czar is no longer the White Spectre; to the people of India he has now become a living visible reality. The result of the present negotiations regarding the Afghan frontier will afford a ready test to the natives of India for estimating in their own minds the relative strength of Russia and Britain; and we regret to say that any accommodation that the latter may feel justified in affording, will be hailed by the greater part of the vernacular press as a sign of weakness on the part of the rulers of India, and be paraded before the people as the submission of England to a Power which she is not able to withstand. Even a greater danger than the menace which the armed strength of Russia would throw out were she to reach the neighbourhood of our Indian frontier, would be the effect which her presence would have in unsettling the minds of our native subjects, and in presenting to them an outlet towards which disaffection and discontent would naturally flow.

At the present moment, while the scales, it may be said, are still swaying between peace and war, it is almost impossible to venture on a prediction as to which side the beam may lean. One fact is plain, that thanks to our own negligence Russia has this time caught us on the hip, and that we shall have to pay the penalty in one way or another. We may build the "golden bridge" for her, but it will be at the expense of our ally, whose interests we are bound to protect, and consequently of our own honour and of our credit in the East. But we may well doubt whether at the present moment Russia will be easily satisfied by concessions. She knows how greatly our military power is crippled by our position in Egypt, and she knows also that another such favourable opportunity for asserting her right to hold on her way may be long before it again presents itself. Probably the consideration that the war could not be confined to Asia, has greater weight with her in professing a desire for peace than any misgivings that she would be likely to entertain about holding her own with us at present on the Afghan frontier. We have every reason also to believe that whatever influence the European Powers may exercise in the dispute, will be in favour of an amicable settlement. Prince Bismarck, probably,