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1885.] == RUSSIA IN SEARCH OF A FRONTIER. ==

the year 1863, when Russia may be said to have definitely set out on her southern march through Central Asia, collision between her and Great Britain has simply been a matter of time. So obvious was this fact, that it was superfluous to assert it, and folly to deny it. Yet there is no question of our time that has been more rancorously discussed than this Central Asian question, which, put in its plainest and most definite form, is – Are British and Russian interests likely to meet in conflict in High Asia? Divested of party feeling and prejudice, the Central Asian question never could have had but one side that would bear exposure to the light of reason. Once committed to a southward movement, Russia must go on until she found herself confronted by some barrier, either natural or political, strong enough to stay her advance. "Imperious necessity," Prince Gortschakoff pointed out in 1864, in his famous circular defending the new annexations, was urging Russia on against her will; and we, with our experience in India, were bound to acknowledge the force of the same motive power which had carried us from Calcutta to the Khyber, until we there met with a natural frontier.

Granted that Prince Gortschakoff's "imperious necessity" afforded a valid excuse for Russia's marching southward from the Jaxartes and absorbing the Central Asian khanates, it was clear that the same motive must continue to impel her on until she encountered a power strong enough to arrest her progress, and a frontier line sufficiently settled to allow of no causes of quarrel or contention with those on the other side. But where was this to be found? Certainly not before she had reached the British Indian border. Thus, accepting "imperious necessity" as the sole motive that was forcing her southward, we had only to wait, with a full assurance that time would speedily bring her face to face with us at the western end of the Khyber Pass. But there were soon evidences that there were other and more powerful motives at work in addition to the avowed impulse. Each great step that Russia has taken in Central Asia has been taken by stealth, in direct violation of her assurances, and frequently in contravention of her solemn guarantees. She has confessed herself that she cannot control her advance: her progress has been uniformly marked by fraud and dissimulation. In either case, whether pushed forward by the irresistible force of events, or pressing onward to gratify a greedy lust of territory, only one conclusion could lie before a sensible onlooker – that a rencontre between Britain and Russia must ultimately ensue, and that it remained with the former to fix the place of meeting.

If any politicians of the "masterly inactivity" school have survived the shock which the events of the last few months must have caused them, with what feelings can they look back upon the long and bitter discussions which have taken place during the past twenty years! Every plea they had advanced in excuse of Russia – every assurance, when another khanate had been swallowed up, that now the bourne had been reached – every apology for Russian annexation, –