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1885.] details of transport to be furnished to corps could easily be settled by a committee, and the manner in which they should be stored when given over to the charge of corps, as they should be, could also be considered. There is one very important point as regards the equipment of our auxiliary forces which requires very early attention, and that is, that a certain proportion of our militia and volunteer artillery regiments should be furnished with guns of position. These guns would require very little manœuvring, and, in most cases, all that would be necessary would be to move them into position on the field of battle. Unless guns are provided as suggested, we should take the field with a terrible deficiency of artillery. It ought, with proper management, to be in our power to overwhelm any invading force with the superior weight and number of our guns, for it is evident that an invader could not bring with him either many or heavy guns, owing to the difficulties of sea transport, both as regards material and horses.

In his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Channel Tunnel, Lord Wolseley is reported in the 'Times' to have stated, that if the whole of the 500,000 men which could be put under arms in this country were hurried out, they would be wholly unsupported by the necessary field artillery, the number of guns practically which are horsed in England being about 210 or 220; and 1600 guns would be necessary for a force of 500,000 men.

This is a fact about which there can be no dispute, and which must be perfectly well known at the War Office; but so far as the outside public are aware, no steps whatever are being taken to remedy our deficiencies in this respect.

The provision of personal equipment, transport, and guns of position, would probably cost about 1½ million pounds.

VII. The construction of an arsenal and a camp of instruction in the north of England have for some years been recognised as the most pressing military necessities of the United Kingdom. The rashness of trusting all our eggs in one basket at Woolwich, as is at present done, is only too evident. Woolwich captured by an invading force, there would be but little use in endeavouring to continue the contest in other parts of the country. Moreover, as has been already pointed out, the strain on our one arsenal in time of emergency would be so great as probably to lead to hopeless confusion and an utter breakdown. It must be remembered that Woolwich is at present the only manufacturing arsenal for both the army and the navy. An arsenal in the north would be well placed as regards security, in case of any attack being made on London, and would be well situated as regards labour, material, and fuel. A camp of instruction for the assembly of regular troops and auxiliary forces from the northern counties, and where a field army could be collected after mobilisation, would be a very great convenience from every point of view. Government already possess considerable rights over the tract of country near York known as Strensall Common, and it would be a great advantage if all rights to the occupation of the ground were acquired, and a camp established there without delay.

The formation of the arsenal and the camp of instruction would probably swallow up 2 million pounds sterling.