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1885.] of for the construction of civil buildings. It is believed that this work of destruction was carried out by the local government, without any reference to the military authorities; and it is probable that other forts, which proved safe places of refuge when we were in difficulties, have met with a similar fate.

It must not be supposed that the distinguished officers who have held the important position of Commander-in-Chief in India since the Mutiny are responsible for the neglect with which the most ordinary military precautions are treated in that country. It is well known that they have made urgent representations to the Government on the subject, and more especially was this done by Lord Napier of Magdala and the present Commander-in-Chief.

Before the Mutiny, none believed in its possibility, nobody foresaw its occurrence. Who can say that we shall not find ourselves in similar peril some day again in India? And if that time ever comes, we shall be but little better prepared to meet the crisis than we were on the last occasion. Some may say, Oh, but if the danger comes, we are sure to have sufficient warning, and it will be time enough then to take measures of safety. But when a feeling of uneasiness begins to prevail, and the military authorities urge the necessity of preparations, they will meet with the same objections on the part of the civil authorities as they have encountered on many previous occasions. They will be told that to take any steps, during a time when our relations with certain portions of the native populations are strained, would certainly increase any feeling of uneasiness existing, and would show at once that we no longer trusted them. It will be the same story over again, – no preparation in time of peace, unwillingness to take precautionary measures when the danger is imminent, and probably massacres and heavy losses when it comes.

It must be remembered that places of refuge are required not only as a safeguard against purely internal disturbances, but they would be of the very greatest advantage in the event of a powerful enemy threatening us on our frontier. One of the first measures that would be attempted by the commander of an army undertaking the invasion of India would be to stir up the natives of the country against us, and to instigate attacks on our arsenals and depots, and along our lines of communication. What an assistance it would then be to the general commanding our army in the field, if he knew that all our posts in the rear were secure from attack, all our sick and families in safety, and that by occupying our places of refuge with comparatively small detachments, the great bulk of our troops were available for active operations.

In what a different manner the French manage their affairs in Algeria! In that country every military station is fortified, and is quite impregnable to any attacks the Arabs might undertake against it. Towards the close of the Franco-German war, when the French troops had been to a large extent withdrawn from Algeria to assist in the defence of the mother country, the Arabs, thinking the opportunity too good to be lost, rose in many parts of the colony, and made very determined assaults on several of the French cantonments. But, thanks to their fortifications, the reduced French garrisons were in every case able to make a successful defence; and beyond the burning of some scattered homesteads,