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1885.] 1873 – this time a Stock Exchange crisis. The money that had been coined abroad by our merchants and manufacturers was, as a matter of gratitude, invested in foreign securities, which were specially created to suit the British market. We kept open house in Capel Court for foreign Governments willing to borrow, for contractors who had railways to build, for speculators who had mines to sell, and for sharpers of every clime and complexion who took the trouble to learn the incantation by which money could be spirited out of our pockets. Swindling was never easier or pleasanter, or more respectable, than in those halcyon days. The borrower had only to promise high enough interest, and money poured in on him. If he had offered 5 per cent on a security as good as Consols, he would have piped in vain in the market-place. When he offered 7 per cent on an unmade railway in South America, he was overwhelmed with subscriptions. When he mentioned 10 per cent in the name of the Government of Honduras, he was wellnigh torn to pieces by eager lenders. As for American railways, they were the veritable lamp of Aladdin. They had only to shed their fertilising light on the boundless prairie, and it would blossom as the rose in dividends. So the great game went on – millions to the East for the Turk and the Khedive, millions to the West for Jay Gould and the Mexicans.

In 1873 the value of the foreign stocks registered on the London Stock Exchange, with interest payable in London, had risen to 444 millions sterling. Ten years before, it had been under 155 millions. The nominal value of the foreign railway securities quoted was 170 millions, against 164 millions in 1865. In the latter year there was not an American railway stock and bond officially known in London, but in 1873 they had got into the official list to the extent of nearly 83 millions. Even that was only the beginning of the flood, for there are now over 320 millions sterling of them honoured with a quotation. Fully 50 millions consist of Sterling Bonds, which, presumably, are altogether held here. The remaining 270 millions is made up of the miscellaneous rubbish of Dollar Bonds and shares, which sell at any price, from five cents on the dollar upwards. When the crash of 1873 came, there were about 500 millions sterling of British money sunk in foreign speculations, more or less wild and apocalyptic. The 7 and 10 per cent lenders who had provided most of it were flayed alive when their coupons began to be returned unpaid, and their stocks ran down from par into the depths of unsaleability. But, after all, they were only a limited class of fools, and the country did not stand still to mourn over them. It felt the shock badly at first, but pulled itself together, and went on again pretty steadily till the fall of the City of Glasgow Bank brought to light an abyss of rottenness which all the while had yawned underneath.

The depression we now suffer from is the slowly gathering result of causes which have been in operation for at least ten years. It began in 1873 with the enormous loss of accumulated capital then sustained in our foreign investments. It has been aggravated year after year by fresh losses on investments, both home and foreign, and by destructive competition in trade. While, on the one hand, it becomes more difficult every day to make money, on the