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enter at length into a discussion concerning the multifarious theories that have been propounded respecting the fact of perception, would be an endless and unnecessary labour. But, as the problem we are about to be engaged with has much in common with these speculations, and as its solution has been retarded by the assumption of various false facts which have invariably been permitted to mingle with them, we must, in a few words, strike at the root of these spurious facts, and, employing a more accurate observation, we will then bring forward, purified from all irrelevant admixture, that great question of psychology—how, or in what circumstances, does Consciousness come into operation?

"Perception," says Dr Brown, "is a state of mind which is induced directly or indirectly by its external cause, as any other feeling is induced by its particular antecedent. If the external cause or object be absent, the consequent feeling, direct or indirect, which we term perception, will not be induced, precisely as any other feeling will not arise without its peculiar antecedent. The relation of cause and effect, in short, is exactly the same in perception as in all the other mental phenomena—a relation of invariable sequence of one change after another change."

This doctrine, which explains the phenomena of perception by placing them under the law of causality, is maintained, we believe, in one form or another, by every philosopher who has theorised on the subject, from Aristotle, down through his scholastic followers, past the occasionalists and pre-established harmonists, and onwards to Dr Brown, who is merely to be considered as one of its most explicit expounders. One and all of them assume that the great law of cause and effect is as little violated in the intercourse which takes place between the external universe and man, as it is in the catenation of the objects themselves constituting that universe. Have we, then, any fault to find with this doctrine, supported as it is by such a host of authorities; and if we have, what is it? We answer that, in our apprehension, it places Dr Brown and all the philosophers who embrace it in a very extraordinary dilemma, which we now proceed to point out.

If by "perception" Dr Brown understands "sensation," and nothing more than sensation, then we admit his statement of the fact to be correct, and his doctrine to be without a flaw. Sensation (the smell of a rose, for example) is certainly "a state" which is "induced by its external cause," namely, by the rose. This is certainly a simple and ordinary instance of sequence,—a mere illustration of the common law of cause and effect, and not a whit more extraordinary than any other exemplification of that great law. We admit, then, that here the phenomenon is correctly observed and stated, that the law of causality embraces sensation, and adequately accounts for its origin. Where, then, does our objection lie? It lies in this, that the origin of sensation is not the true and pertinent problem requiring