Page:Bee-keeping not a nuisance ... History of the lawsuit entitled Z. A. Clark vs. the city of Arkadelphia, Arkansas, and defended by the "National bee-keepers' union." (IA beekeepingnotnu00nati).pdf/3

Rh The argument of Judge S. W. Williams, one of the attorneys for the “National Bee-Keepers’ Union,” is here given in full, because of its very great importance and value for reference.

This case discloses a most flagrant violation of the property rights of the citizen. It seems that Clark, who lived in the outskirts of Arkadelphia, a village of some two thousand inhabitants, scattered over territory enough for one hundred thousand—a ruse in urbe—had a few bees, as the record shows (page 1), 35 stands. This gave rise to a persecution unparalleled since the days of the boot and the thumb screw, to force Clark to give up his property.

Those running the city at the time, not content to make a test case, and have the question settled by this Court—after passing this sweeping ordinance, commenced a system of daily arrests, trials without jury, judgments and imprisonments, resulting in appeals; and this is one of a numerous spawn of cases from the same oppressive hot-bed.

At last Clark was compelled, at a great loss, to give up his property, and quit his business of bee-raising and honey-production in Arkadelphia—a principal source of his support—as an alternative to indefinite imprisonment.

When the case came to the Circuit Court, one test case was tried, upon motion to dismiss, and the Court below held the ordinance void, because it did more than regulate the keeping of property—it forbade the owning, or keeping a valuable and useful property in the town; in effect holding that the bee was per se, a nuisance. For if it was not, then its presence in a town could not be prohibited by any law.

Before proceeding to argue the case we call attention to the statement of Counsel, at page 9 of their Brief, that it is a matter of common knowledge that they are liable to sting children, etc. It is not a matter of common knowledge, because it is not true: unless children molest them at their hives, or catch them. But because a domestic insect may sting or hurt under some circumstances, no more makes it a nuisance—per se—and liable to prohibition, than the fact that a horse may kick, may run away in harness and kill a child; or an ox may gore persons with its horns, would make these animals nuisances per se.

I venture the assertion that there is not a town or city in the United States where bees are not kept. I know they are now kept in Little Rock, and have ever been. My nearest neighbors have them. I have kept them in my yard while rearing a family of children, and I cannot recall any instance of an injury from bees. I speak this in the line of common knowledge, which the Court must recognize.

I can recall the kick of a pony, and a cow running over a child—shall keeping of horses and cows be forbidden by ordinance? And while bees have been kept for centuries in towns, it is an argument in their favor that Arkadelphia is the first on record to forbid them. I respectfully submit that while the Court must judicially know the habits of all animals, the “little busy bee” should have a chance with the cow, the horse, the sportive dog, the gentle, purring cat, and even the festive chicken cock—on a par with counsel’s skunk-farm story—a pure fiction of Bill Nye.

I may be allowed to refer to the fact that last year two instances are given in newspapers, one authentic at Hot Springs, one elsewhere, not so well established—where children were killed by a chicken cock attacking them. For this reason can the keeping of chickens be forbidden? The bee has no such record of homicidal or infanticidal results. Will these instances, or the fighting of mother-hens over their broods, make chickens per se nuisances? Unless bees, under all circumstances, however kept and tended, and in any quantities however small are per se nuisances—this ordinance cannot be sustained; for it does not regulate the quantity, or manner of keeping, or make the keeper responsible, as in case of other dangerous animals, and punishable for consequences, but assumes to destroy property in them in Arkadelphia altogether, or compel a man to leave his home and buy another, or quit his business.

The provisions of Sections 751 to 764, Mansfield, does not give the city of Arkadelphia power to take a man’s property for public use, without compensation, under the power to prevent injury or annoyance. Section 751