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 speech clause [of Indiana’s Constitution]”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (“We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”). In regulating obscenity, however, states must be careful not to brush so broadly as to chill those classes of speech that are protected. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (“We acknowledge … the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited.”)

We have found that Indiana’s obscenity statute is not broad enough to offend the First Amendment or Indiana’s Constitution. Fordyce, 569 N.E.2d at 359–60. But the United States Supreme Court has articulated a narrow path for constitutional obscenity restrictions. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (“[W]e now confine the permissible scope of [obscenity] regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.”). We hesitate to adopt any interpretation that would broaden the meaning of the statute and risk upsetting its constitutionality. See, e.g., Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 396 (Ind. 2018) (“[S]tatutes should be interpreted so as to avoid constitutional issues.”).

Statutory definitions shape our analysis. Per statute, something is obscene if: