Page:Bank Markazi v. Peterson SCOTUS slip opinion.pdf/2

2

The Second Circuit affirmed.

Held: Section 8772 does not violate the separation of powers. Pp. 12–24.

(a) Article III of the Constitution establishes an independent Judiciary with the “province and duty...to say what the law is” in particular cases and controversies. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177. Necessarily, that endowment of authority blocks Congress from “requir[ing] federal courts to exercise the judicial power in a manner that Article III forbids.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218. Although Article III bars Congress from telling a court how to apply pre-existing law to particular circumstances, Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 438–439, Congress may amend a law and make the amended prescription retroactively applicable in pending cases, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 267–268; United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110. In United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 146, this Court enigmatically observed that Congress may not “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department...in [pending] cases.” More recent decisions have clarified that Klein does not inhibit Congress from “amend[ing] applicable law.” Robertson, 503 U.S., at 441; Plaut, 514 U.S., at 218. Section 8772 does just that: It requires a court to apply a new legal standard in a pending postjudgment enforcement proceeding. No different result obtains because, as Bank Markazi argues, the outcome of applying §8772 to the facts in the proceeding below was a “foregone conclusio[n].” Brief for Petitioner 47. A statute does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts. See Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11. Pp. 12–19.

(b) Nor is §8772 invalid because, as Bank Markazi further objects, it prescribes a rule for a single, pending case identified by caption and docket number. The amended law upheld in Robertson also applied to cases identified in the statute by caption and docket number. 503 U.S., at 440. Moreover, §8772 is not an instruction governing one case only: It facilitates execution of judgments in 16 suits. While consolidated for administrative purposes at the execution stage, the judgment-execution claims were not independent of the original actions for damages and each retained its separate character. In any event, the Bank’s argument rests on the flawed assumption that legislation must be generally applicable. See Plaut, 514 U.S., at 239, n. 9. This Court and lower courts have upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’ legislative power laws governing one or a very small number of specific subjects. Pp. 19–21. (c) Adding weight to this decision, §8772 is an exercise of congressional authority regarding foreign affairs, a domain in which the con-