Page:BNSF Railway Company v. Michael D. Loos.pdf/11

8 pay for time lost. Restricting “compensation” to pay for active service, the Court of Appeals relied on statutory history and, in particular, the eventual deletion of two references to pay for time lost contained in early renditions of the RRTA. See also post, at 6–7 (presenting the Eighth Circuit’s statutory history argument). To understand the Eighth Circuit’s position, and why, in our judgment, that position does not withstand scrutiny, some context is in order.

On enactment of the RRTA in 1937, Congress made “compensation” taxable at the time it was earned and provided specific guidance on when pay for time lost should be “deemed earned.” Congress instructed: “The term ‘compensation’ means any form of money remuneration earned by an individual for services rendered as an employee…, including remuneration paid for time lost as an employee, but [such] remuneration… shall be deemed earned in the month in which such time is lost.” 1937 RRTA, §1(e), 50 Stat. 436 (emphasis added). In 1946, Congress clarified that the phrase “pa[y] for time lost” meant payment for “an identifiable period of absence from the active service of the employer, including absence on account of personal injury.” Act of July 31, 1946 (1946 Act), §2, 60 Stat. 722.

Thus, originally, the RRTA stated that “compensation” included pay for time lost, and the language added in 1946 presupposed the same. In subsequent amendments, however, Congress removed the references to pay for time lost. First, in 1975, Congress made “compensation” taxable when paid rather than when earned. Congress simultaneously removed the 1937 language that both referred to pay for time lost and specified when such pay should be “deemed earned.” So amended, the definitional sentence, in its current form, reads: “The term ‘compensation’ means any form of money remuneration paid to an individual for services rendered as an employee….” Act of Aug. 9,