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6 There is a better way. Our job is to interpret the laws Congress has adopted. It is a task that “begins with the language of the [relevant] statute[s]” and, when “the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 438 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because no one doubts that §1331 vests district courts with jurisdiction to hear these cases, the only question properly before us is whether Congress has actually carved out some exception in some other statute. The government points to two candidates. But the government’s arguments from those laws are so improbable that the Court barely mentions them. I pause to walk through each only to illustrate how these cases should have been resolved.

In Ms. Cochran’s case, the government directs our attention to §78y(a)(1) of the Exchange Act. That provision says that “[a] person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission … may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals … by filing in such court … a written petition requesting that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.” 15 U. S. C. §78y(a)(1). Plainly, the statute promises jurisdiction in a court of appeals for those