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Rh worse, it exhibits familiarity with none of them. No one disputes that §1331 represents a valid exercise of Congress’s authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the district courts. No one questions that §1331 permits cases like those before us to proceed. No Member of the Court points to any statute Congress has adopted that speaks otherwise. Under the law, that should be the end of the matter. But under Thunder Basin, courts may refuse individuals their right to a judicial forum based on nothing more than suppositions about “implici[t]” congressional “inten[tions].” Ante, at 7. Divesting jurisdiction by mere implication goes from out-of-bounds to the name of the game. Along the way, this Court arrogates to itself a power to control the jurisdiction of lower federal courts that the Constitution reserves to Congress.

All to what end? At bottom, Thunder Basin rests on a view that it is sometimes more important to allow agencies to work without the bother of having to answer suits against them than it is to allow individuals their day in court. But when Congress holds that view, it does not ask us to juggle a variety of factors and then guess at the implicit intentions of legislators past. It simply tells us. See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §1818(i)(1) (“[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section or under section 1831o or 1831p–1 of this title no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under any such section”); 42 U. S. C. §405(h) (“No action against the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter”).